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Transnational Fiduciary Law in Bond
Markets: A Case Study
Moritz Renner*

Centering on a case study, this Article discusses the legal aspects of “net-short debt investing”
on global bond markets through the lens of transnational fiduciary law. The aim of the Article is
twofold. On the one hand, it is a comparative study on the potential and limitations of fiduciary
law in a “hard case.” This analysis is inductive in nature. It aims at contributing to a better
understanding of fiduciary law doctrines in both common and civil law jurisdictions. On the other
hand, the Article focuses on the specific challenges of fiduciary law in transnational settings. In
particular, it analyses the influence of transnational private ordering on the establishment of
fiduciary duties in state law. The Article makes the case that the concept of fiduciary duties should
be interpreted with a view to facilitating mechanisms of private ordering.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this Article is twofold. On the one hand, it is a comparative study
on the potential benefits and limitations of fiduciary law in a “hard case.” This
analysis is inductive in nature. It aims at contributing to a better understanding of
fiduciary law doctrines in both common and civil law jurisdictions. On the other
hand, the Article focuses on the specific challenges of fiduciary law in transnational
settings. In particular, it analyzes the influence of transnational private ordering on
the establishment of fiduciary duties in state law.
Centering on a case study, the Article discusses the legal aspects of “net-short
debt investing” on global bond markets through the lens of transnational fiduciary
law. Generally, the term “net-short” refers to the positioning of an investor who
benefits as the price of a specific financial asset decreases. Net-short debt investing
is an increasingly popular investment strategy which enables bondholders (i.e.
holders of a company’s debt) to cash in on the default of the bond-issuing company
by building up a net-short position in credit default swaps (infra II). The strategy
raises the question whether the net-short investor has a fiduciary duty of loyalty
towards (1) the issuer of the bond, (2) other bondholders and (3) the counterparty
of the credit default swap (infra III). This legal question has a transnational
dimension: large-scale bond sales do not only involve a number of different
jurisdictions; they also heavily build on mechanisms of private ordering (infra IV).
The Article argues that any legal reconstruction of net-short debt investing
must consider this transnational dimension (infra V). Specifically, the Article will
make the case that the concept of fiduciary duties should be interpreted with a view
to facilitating mechanisms of transnational private ordering.
II. CASE STUDY: NET-SHORT DEBT INVESTING
The problems of net-short debt investing have recently received considerable
media attention: the Financial Times sees USA Inc. face “a growing threat from
activist investors,” whereas others critically discuss the role of “hedge-fund debt
cops.”1 Even more pointedly, an opinion piece in the New York Times claims, What
Hedge Funds Consider a Win is a Disaster for Everyone Else.2 What, then, is net-short debt
* Moritz
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1. Sujeet Indap, USA Inc. Faces Growing Threat from Activist Debt Investors, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Sept. 18, 2018) at 13; Mary Childs, Windstream Dispute Highlights Aurelius’ Role as a Hedge-Fund Debt Cop,
BARRON’S (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/windstream-dispute-highlights aurelius-role-as-a-hedge-fund-debt-cop-1535750611.
2. William D. Cohan, What Hedge Funds Consider a Win Is a Disaster for Everyone Else, N.Y. TIMES
(May 12, 2019).
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investing? The phenomenon is well illustrated by the much-discussed Windstream v.
Aurelius case, which has recently been decided by a New York District Court.3 In
short, the (stylized) facts of the case are as follows:
In 2013 Windstream, a telecoms company, issued bonds in order to finance
its operations. As is standard market practice, the bond documentation contained a
number of so-called covenants. Bond covenants, as an instrument of creditor
protection, are clauses that oblige the bond-issuer to comply with certain financial
ratios, such as a specific debt-to-earnings ratio, and to refrain from risky financial
activities.4 One of the bond covenants prohibited that Windstream transfers any
assets to affiliated companies. Windstream violated this prohibition when it
transferred a considerable number of its network services to a holding company in
2015, allegedly for regulatory purposes. Given this violation of a covenant, the
bondholders, with a quorum of 25 %, would have been entitled to declare an “event
of default” after a 60-day cure period and demand immediate repayment of the
bonds (acceleration).5
However, the bondholders took no action after Windstream violated the
covenant. This inactivity was in line with common bond market practice. Triggering
an event of default and accelerating repayment of the bond is considered the
bondholders’ “nuclear option,” as it almost invariably leads to the bankruptcy of
the bond-issuer. Thus, bondholders mostly use covenant violations as bargaining
chips for adjusting the financial conditions of the bond and restructuring the
company’s debt rather than enforce the clauses by demanding immediate repayment
(infra IV). In this regard, the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute is special. Aurelius, a US
hedge fund, bought 25 % of the Windstream bonds in 2017, i.e. well after the
covenant violation. It then took swift action by declaring an event of default and
demanding immediate repayment of the bond, causing Windstream to fall into
bankruptcy. Why did Aurelius act this way? According to unproven market rumors,
Aurelius had simultaneously built a net-short position on Windstream’s debt by
buying credit default swaps (CDS) worth 10 times the amount of its bond exposure.
Thus, Windstream’s default—which Aurelius had triggered itself (a so-called
“manufactured default”) —allowed Aurelius to cash in on the credit default swaps.
Aurelius effectively relied on the letter of the bond covenant in order to benefit
from Windstream’s bankruptcy.
For Aurelius, this strategy certainly made business sense. Whether it made
sense from a broader economic perspective seems rather questionable, given that
3. U.S. Bank Nat’l Association v. Windstream Services, LLC, No. 12-CV-7857 (JMF), 2019
WL 948120 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2019). The case was brought by the indenture trustee, U.S. Bank
National Association, on behalf of the bondholders. The trusteeship arrangement between U.S. Bank
National Association and the bondholders raises no issues of fiduciary law in the case at hand.
4. 3 PHILIP R. WOOD, INTERNATIONAL LOANS, BONDS, GUARANTEES, LEGAL OPINIONS §
5–001, at 69 (2d ed. 2007).
5. Section 6.02 of the bond indenture provided that if an event of default occurs, “the Trustee
or the Holders of at least 25% in principal amount of the then outstanding Notes may declare all the
Notes to be due and payable immediately by notice in writing to the Issuers specifying the Event of
Default.”
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Windstream as the bond-issuer (as well as its shareholders and employees), other
bondholders and the counterparty of Aurelius’ credit default swaps all stood to lose.
On the other hand, one could argue that broader market benefits in the form of
deterrence effects for potential covenant violators achieved through Aurelius’
“policing” role outweigh these individual losses. As a matter of law, the question is
what duties Aurelius had towards other market participants (infra III). Both the
economic and the legal assessment of the case, however, are contingent upon the
structure of transnational bond markets and the reasonable expectations of market
participants (infra IV). This Article argues that fiduciary law can play an important
role in translating market structures and expectations into legal categories.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
As the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute shows, the legal implications of net-short
debt investing concern at least three different relationships: the relationships
between bondholder and issuer (infra 1), within the group of bondholders (infra 2)
as well as between bondholder, and CDS counterparty (infra 3). To each of these
relationships, different laws may apply under conflict-of-laws rules. The legal
framing of the relationships might particularly differ between common law and civil
law jurisdictions.
A. Between Bondholder and Issuer
In the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute, the bonds were issued under New York
law. Depending on the nationality of the issuer and the relevant market, bonds are
subject to different applicable laws. For German companies, for example, it is
common that bonds are issued under German law, even if the majority of investors
is domiciled in other jurisdictions. In any case, the bond covenants will likely be
based on transnational standard documentation (infra IV).
1. Common Law
Under New York law, Windstream seemed to have no effective defense
against Aurelius’ strategy. In the District Court’s conclusions of law, Judge Furman
elaborates that the court’s “sole task is to enforce the Indenture’s plain terms.”6
From a common law perspective, this approach seems justified in principle. Under
the common law of contracts, “good faith does not envision loyalty to the
contractual counterparty but rather faithfulness to the scope, purpose, and terms of
the parties’ contract.”7 There is no general doctrine of abuse of rights, but “if one
has a right to do an act, then one can, in general, do it for whatever reason one

6. U.S. Bank Nat’l Association, 2019 WL 948120, at 23.
7. ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC., 50 A.3d
434, 430–31 (Del. Ch. 2012).

2020]

TRANSNATIONAL FIDUCIARY LAW IN BOND MARKETS

117

wishes.”8 These general considerations, however, are of limited import in the field
of business law, where the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) as the model code
for commercial transactions expressly incorporates the principle of good faith.
Thus, some courts and commentators have relied on the principle of good
faith in order to establish lender liability in a wide array of banking law cases. In
several decisions, both federal and state courts have held that a lender’s right to
accelerate or terminate a loan may only be exercised in good faith.9 These decisions
were mostly based on the state-law adoptions of sec. 1-309 U.C.C.1011 Under these
standards, courts tend to allow the use of acceleration and termination provisions
in loan contracts only as a “shield” rather than a “sword.”12 Violations of good faith
duties by the lender can give rise to contract claims for damages or potentially also
tort-based lender liability.13 Substantively, the duty of good faith imposes a standard
of “commercial reasonableness” on the lender.14 It seems highly questionable,
however, whether such a standard would have enjoined Aurelius from accelerating
the repayment of the bond in our case. If we merely look at Windstream and
Aurelius as two parties in a lending relationship, Aurelius did have a legitimate
interest in enforcing the covenant after it was breached by Windstream.
Beyond the principle of good faith,15 far-reaching duties of loyalty may be
imposed on the parties when there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties,16
i.e. when one of the parties “is under a duty to act for or give advice for the benefit
of another upon matters within the scope of the relation.”17 In such a relationship,
the fiduciary has specific obligations to the extent that the beneficiary “would be

8. Jack Beatson, Public Law Influences in Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN
CONTRACT LAW 266–67 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995) (quoting Allen v. Flood [1891]
AC 1).
9. E.g., State Nat’l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); K.M.C. Co.
v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
10. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.309 (West 2003) (“A term providing that one party or
that party’s successor in interest may accelerate payment or performance or require collateral or
additional collateral ‘at will’ or when the party ‘deems itself insecure,’ or words of similar import, means
that the party has power to do so only if that party in good faith believes that the prospect of payment
or performance is impaired.”).
11. E.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.208 (West 2003).
12. Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979); cf., Cheryl Anderson, Breach of
Good Faith in Lending and Related Theories, 64 N. D. L. REV. 273, 313 (1988).
13. Alan A. Blakeboro & Rex Heesemann, Good Faith Duties and Tort Remedies in Lender Liability
Litigation, 15 W. ST. U. L. REV. 617 (1988); James Mabry Vickery, A Special Relationship: The Use of the
Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Impose Tort Damages in Contracts between Lender and Borrower, 9 REV.
OF LITIG. 93 (1990). For a purely contracts-based solution, see Sandra Chutorian, Tort Remedies for Breach
of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the
Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 402–06 (1986).
14. Jonathan K. Van Patten, Lender Liability: Changing or Enforcing the Ground Rules, 33 S. D. L.
REV. 387, 407 (1988).
15. This complementarity reflects the origins of fiduciary law in equity. On this aspect, see Cecil
J. Hunt, The Price of Trust: An Examination of Fiduciary Duty and the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 719, 728–29 (1994).
16. Beatson, supra note 8, at 267.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 874 cmt. a (AM LAW INST. 1979).
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justified in expecting loyal conduct.”18 From this perspective, the legal evaluation of
the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute hinges on the question whether Aurelius was a
fiduciary of Windstream and whether it had a fiduciary duty (of loyalty) to refrain
from enforcing the bond covenant.
The particular question of bondholders’ fiduciary duties towards the issuer has
apparently not been discussed in banking law literature. Most related articles focus
on the inverse situation. They ask—mostly from a corporate governance
perspective—whether the management of the issuer has fiduciary duties towards
bondholders.19 Our case, however, seems much more closely related to
constellations where fiduciary duties are imposed on a bank or other debt investors
based on their particular role as a lender.
As there is no general doctrine of fiduciary duties in banking law, courts and
commentators tend to assume fiduciary duties of banks only if either the bank acted
as an agent/trustee or under “special circumstances.”20 In the lending business,
“special circumstances” mostly refer to situations that deviate from the model of an
arm’s length relationship between creditor and debtor.21 Thus, banks as lenders have
fiduciary duties towards the borrower if they have “control or an informational
advantage over the borrower.”22 Most examples in point concern cases where banks
acted outside of their usual lending role, e.g. by giving advice that the borrower
relied upon.23
Does the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute fall under this category of cases? It
might be argued that a “special circumstance” could be that Aurelius, by virtue of
holding 25 % of the bonds, had particular leverage over Aurelius as it was able to
trigger an event of default at will. On the other hand, however, Windstream itself
had violated the bond covenant. Aurelius did not overstep the contractual
boundaries of its role as a lender. Quite to the contrary, it availed itself of a
contractual right that expressly aimed at safeguarding its financial interests. Thus,
the case for establishing a fiduciary duty that would enjoin Aurelius from triggering
a default seems rather weak. Even those who argue for a broad application of
fiduciary duties in lending relationships do not discuss a restriction of the lender’s
termination rights.24

18. Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and their
Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 936 (2006).
19. Cf., e.g., David M. W. Harvey, Bondholders’ Rights and the Case for a Fiduciary Duty, 65 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1023 (1991); George S. Corey, M. W. Marr, Jr. & Michael F. Spivey, Are Bondholders
Owed a Fiduciary Duty?, 18 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 971 (1991).
20. Andrew F. Tuch, Fiduciary Principles in Banking, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 125, 127 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019); Hunt, supra note 15, at 739–50. However,
there is an argument to be made that the lender-borrower relationship necessarily has fiduciary elements
that give rise to corresponding duties, cf. Hunt, supra note 15, at 723–27.
21. Tuch, supra note 20, at 127.
22. Id. at 127–28.
23. E.g., Morris v. Resolution Trust Corp., 622 A.2d 708 (Me. 1993); Buxcel v. First Fidelity
Bank, 601 N.W.2d 593 (S.D. 1999).
24. Most notably Hunt, supra note 15, at 775–78.
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2. Civil Law
Had Windstream issued the bond under German law, the legal situation would
have been quite different at the outset. As in most civil law jurisdictions, there is no
elaborate doctrine of fiduciary duties in German law.25 However, there are
functional equivalents to such duties with a potentially much broader range of
application. Like many civil law jurisdictions,26 German law establishes a principle
of “good faith and fair dealings” (sec. 242 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) for all contracts.
Legal acts that run counter to this principle are void. At the same time, the law of
contracts establishes a general duty to protect the other party’s rights and interests
in sec. 241 (2) Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. Violations of this duty can give rise to
contractual claims for damages. These general clauses are open to different
interpretations and are mostly substantiated on a case-by-case basis.
It is widely agreed, however, that the principle of good faith implies a farreaching prohibition of the abuse of rights.27 The prohibition is interpreted in a
context-specific manner, so that, e.g. relationships of agency and trust give rise to a
strong duty of loyalty, whereas there are only minimal requirements of consistent
behavior for transactional contracts.28 On this basis, the abuse-of-rights doctrine
potentially has a very wide range of applications.
In banking law, it has specifically been discussed whether the principle of
“good faith and fair dealings” can effectively enjoin a lender from demanding
repayment in certain situations. This problem is often expressly framed as a question
of the “fiduciary duties” (Treuepflichten) of the lender.29 The doctrinal foundation of
this argument differs from the common law approach to the extent that fiduciary
duties are understood as a mere concretion of the general principle of good faith.
In substance, however, many of the same considerations apply.
Most commentators agree that even a relationship bank is free to terminate
the credit line of its customer if the latter is in financial distress.30 However, the

25. Thilo Kuntz, Das Recht der Interessenwahrungsverhältnisse und Perspektiven von Fiduciary Law in
Deutschland- zugleich ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von öffentlichem Recht und Privatrecht am Beispiel der
wertpapierhandelsrechtlichen Wohlverhaltenspflichten und der Geschäftsleiterhaftung, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR
KARSTEN SCHMIDT ZUM 80. GEBURTSTAG 761 (Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2019).
26. On the civil tradition of “good faith” and its role as a “legal irritant” in common law
jurisdictions, see Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up
in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
27. Cf. e.g., Claudia Schubert, § 242, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH paras. 199–202 (Franz Jürgen Säcker & Roland Rixecker eds., Beck 9th ed. 2019).
28. CHRISTOPH KUMPAN, DER INTERESSENKONFLIKT IM DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHT 10003 (Mohr Siebeck ed., 2014); Schubert, supra note 27, paras. 236–38 (2019). The details of the
interrelation of general contract law and the law of agency and trust are much disputed in detail. Its
existence in principle, however, is widely accepted.
29. Most notably Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Kreditkündigung und Kreditverweigerung, 143 ZHR 113,
116 (1979); more restrictively Klaus Hopt, Rechtspflichten der Kreditinstitute zur Kreditversorgung,
Kreditbelassung und Sanierung von Unternehmen. Wirtschafts–und bankrechtliche Überlegungen zum deutschen und
französischen Recht, 143 ZHR 139, 159 (1979). On the further discussion, see BANKVERTRAGSRECHT,
Vierter Teil paras. 137–39 (Stefan Grundmann & Moritz Renner eds., De Gruyter 5th ed. 2014).
30. Cf., BANKVERTRAGSRECHT, supra note 29, para. 137.
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special “fiduciary” role of the bank limits this freedom in two distinct ways. On the
one hand, an outright abuse of rights is prohibited: A bank may not terminate a loan
if the debtor can still be saved by an extension of the credit line, and if the
termination does not even advance the bank’s financial interests.31 On the other
hand, the bank may not behave in a self-contradictory way: If –based on past
behavior– a debtor can reasonably expect his relationship bank to extend existing
credit lines, these can only be terminated for compelling reasons.32
The Windstream v. Aurelius dispute falls under neither category. The termination
of the bond by Aurelius was not outright abusive, as it did make business sense for
Aurelius to terminate. Furthermore, Aurelius’ behavior was not prima facie
contradictory as –individually– Aurelius did nothing to cause a legitimate
expectation on Windstream’s side that the bond covenant would not be enforced.
Thus, a civil law perspective on the constellation will likely lead to the same results
as the common law analysis.
B. Within the Group of Bondholders
It seems conceivable that, by enforcing the bond covenant, Aurelius violated
a fiduciary duty towards other bondholders. In both common law and civil law
jurisdictions, the content and reach of mutual duties between lenders or
bondholders is highly controversial. Much depends on the conception of the legal
relationship constituted by a group of investors: Is it merely contractual, or does a
group of investors amount to some form of legal association? In the latter case,
individual investors are more likely to be bound by specific fiduciary duties.
1. Common Law
In common law jurisdictions, it is widely held that investors do not form any
kind of legal association that would give rise to specific mutual duties. The question
has been discussed for syndicated lending in particular, where a number of lenders
contribute individual shares to a large-scale corporate loan. Although earlier court
decisions have not been unequivocal in this matter,33 most commentators agree that
–even in such cases– the arrangement between the lenders is “not a partnership,
joint venture, or other association.”34 A fortiori, this also holds true for the
relationship between bondholders, where the degree of cooperation between
investors is usually much lower than in a syndicated loan. The market standard
agreement issued by the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA)
expressly provides –for the underwriting banks (“managers”)– that “[n]one of the
provisions of this Agreement or any other agreement relating to the Securities shall
31. Hopt, supra note 29, at 162–63 (1979); CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS, BANKVERTRAGSRE
para. 1266 (De Gruyter 2d ed. 1981).
32. CANARIS, supra note 31, at 125 (1979).
33. See Crédit Français Intl., S.A. v. Sociedad Financiera de Comercio, C.A., 128 Misc.2d 564,
581 (1985) (holding that a consortium of lenders constitutes a joint venture under New York law).
34. AGASHA MUGASHA, THE LAW OF MULTI-BANK FINANCING. SYNDICATED LOANS AND
THE SECONDARY LOAN MARKET para. 5.09 (Oxford Univ. Press. 2007) (with further references).
CHT,
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constitute or be deemed to constitute a partnership or joint venture between the
Managers or any of them.”35
Nevertheless, there are situations in which a lender or bondholder might have
fiduciary duties towards other investors. This is most evident when the lender or
bondholder acts as an agent or trustee of the other investors, a common practice
for administering the outstanding debt and facilitating its repayment. Standard loan
documentation often contains a disclaimer of fiduciary responsibilities for these
functions.36 The validity of such disclaimers is subject to dispute (infra IV).
With a view to the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute, however, it is most interesting
to note that courts have discussed the existence of fiduciary duties between
investors well beyond constellations of trusteeship and agency. Most notably, the
English High Court in the Redwood case37 discussed whether a majority of lenders is
enjoined by fiduciary duties from taking a (debt restructuring) decision that would
be harmful to a minority of the lenders. The High Court held that this may in fact
be the case – but only if the majority acts in bad faith and thus abuses the powers
conferred to it. Applied to our case, the result of this “abuse of powers” standard is
far from clear. When Aurelius used its 25 % share of the bonds to declare an event
of default and thus triggered Windstream’s bankruptcy, other bondholders that had
not sufficiently hedged their exposure were disadvantaged. But Aurelius’ decision
to do so was not taken with the purpose of disadvantaging other creditors. Without
this subjective element, there is no abuse of powers – and thus no breach of a
fiduciary duty.
2. Civil Law
In contrast to the common law approach, civil law jurisdictions like Germany
consider a lenders’ consortium to be a partnership.38 As a result, they transpose the
corporate law doctrine of fiduciary duties to the relationship between lenders.39
However, most commentators clearly differentiate between loans and bonds.
Whereas lenders contributing to a syndicated loan are widely regarded as forming a

35. Int’l Capital Mkt. Ass’n. Standard Form Agreement Between Managers, § 9 (Dec. 2018).
36. For example, Loan Mkt. Ass’n., Facility Agreement, para. 28.5, provides that “[n]othing in any
Finance Document constitutes the Agent or the Arranger as a trustee or fiduciary of any other person.”
37. Redwood Master Fund Ltd v. TD Bank Europe Ltd. [2006] 1 BCLC 149.
38. For German law, see Carsten Schäfer, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM
BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, Vorbem. § 705 para. 58 (Franz Jürgen Säcker & Roland Rixecker eds.,
Beck 7th ed. 2017); ANDREAS DIEM & CHRISTIAN JAHN, AKQUISITIONSFINANZIERUNGEN –
KREDITE FÜR UNTERNEHMENSKÄUFE § 31 para 2 seq (Beck 4th ed. 2019); Kai Andreas Schaffelhuber
& Frank Sölch, in MÜNCHENER HANDBUCH DES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS, § 31 para. 9 (Hans
Gummert & Lutz Weipert eds., Beck 5th ed. 2019); JENS WENZEL, RECHTSFRAGEN
INTERNATIONALER KONSORTIALKREDITVERTRÄGE 256 et seq. (Nomos ed. 2006). The question is
highly disputed in French and Spanish law.
39. For a critical account of the pertinent German law, see Moritz Renner, Treupflichten beim
grenzüberschreitenden Konsortialkredit, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR BANKRECHT UND BANKWIRTSCHAFT 278, 285–
87 (2018).
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partnership, bondholders are not.40 Therefore, fiduciary duties between
bondholders do not reach beyond the minimum standard prohibiting an abuse of
rights or self-contradictory behavior. As a result, Aurelius’ behavior is to be judged
much along the same lines as under the common law approach – and cannot be
considered to be in breach of a fiduciary duty.
C. Between Bondholder and CDS Counterparty
CDS contracts are usually made under New York or English law, based on
standard documentation by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA). In the ISDA Master Agreement under English law, each party expressly
represents that “[t]he other party is not acting as a fiduciary for or an adviser to it
in respect of the Transaction.”41 This is in line with the typical risk allocation of a
swap contract, where the parties clearly delineate their respective responsibilities.
There is nothing to suggest that this disclaimer of fiduciary duties would be held
unenforceable (see below IV), either in a common or a civil law court.
In March, the ISDA has published a proposal to the ISDA Credit Derivatives
Definitions that intends to preclude “manufactured defaults” allowing investors to
benefit from events of default.42 However, these definitions only capture defaults
that have been “manufactured” through a collusion of investor and issuer – another
increasingly common practice spooking market participants.43 It does not
encompass defaults brought about by strategies of net-short debt investing such as
the one employed by Aurelius.
At the same time, capital market regulators from different jurisdictions have
discussed the issues of net-short debt investing and “manufactured defaults” as
potential instances of market manipulation.44 So far, their inquiries have not led to
tangible results. Yet it might prove to be an interesting test case for the idea of
public fiduciary duties of capital market investors.

40. E.g., Christian Hofmann & Christoph Keller, Collective Action Clauses, 2011 ZHR 684, 718
(2011); FLORIAN LEBER, DER SCHUTZ UND DIE ORGANISATION DER OBLIGATIONÄRE NACH DEM
SCHULDVERSCHREIBUNGSGESETZ 254 (Nomos ed. 2012). For a rare exception, see PHILIP
LIEBENOW, DAS SCHULDVERSCHREIBUNGSGESETZ ALS ANLEIHEORGANISATIONSRECHT UND
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT § 14 (Jörn Axel Kämmerer et al. eds., Mohr Siebeck ed. 2016).
41. Int’l. Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n., Master Agreement and Schedule, Part 4 (m)(3) (2002).
42. Int’l. Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n., Proposed Amendments to the 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives
Definitions Relating to Narrowly Tailored Credit Events (2019),
https://www.isda.org/a/nyKME/20190306-NTCE-consultation-doc-complete.pdf (last accessed
July 20, 2019).
43.
Joe Rennison, Hovnanian Misses Bond Payment in Controversial ‘Manufactured Default,’
FINANCIAL TIMES (May 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/56c729b4-4da4-11e8-8a8e22951a2d8493 (last accessed July 20, 2019).
44. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n [SEC], Press Release, Joint Statement on Opportunistic Strategies in
the Credit Derivatives Market (June 24, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-106 (last
accessed July 7, 2019).
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D. Interim Conclusion
The Windstream v. Aurelius dispute is a hard case for applying fiduciary duties.
Although the practice of net-short debt investing might have adverse effects on a
range of market participants –the issuer of the bond, other bondholders, CDS
counterparties– neither common law nor civil law consider it a breach of the
investor’s fiduciary duties. This leaves affected market participants largely without
viable remedies against the practice.
IV. THE TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSION OF FIDUCIARY LAW
This Article suggests that we might reach a different conclusion if we take the
transnational dimension of the case seriously. It argues that the bond market is a
prime example for transnational private ordering (infra 1). Against this background,
it outlines a transnational approach to fiduciary law (infra 2). Following this
approach, it takes a fresh look at the justification and scope of fiduciary duties in
both common and civil law jurisdictions (infra 3). Specifically, it examines the
potential of fiduciary law to “enable and bolster social norms”45 formed in a
transnational context.
A. Transnational Ordering in the Bond Market
1. Transnational Legal Orders
The concept of transnational law has always been contested. Until today, the
discussion is dominated by two opposing camps – as far as the existence of
transnational law is accepted at all.46 On the one hand, there are authors in the
tradition of Jessup who aim at developing a functional conception of transnational
law as “all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers.”47
On the other hand, there are authors who make the case for a more rigorous
definition of transnational law, often taking the ancient lex mercatoria as an example.48
The “wars of faith”49 over the existence and nature of the medieval law
merchant and its potential successors shall not be revisited in this Article. For the

45. Matthew Harding, Fiduciary Law and Social Norms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 798 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
46. It is disputed, for example, by F. A. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157 (Pieter Sanders ed. 1976); Michael Mustill,
The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-five Years, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR THE RT. HON. LORD
WILBERFORCE 149 (Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie eds., 1987).
47. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (Yale Univ. Press. 1956); similarly Gralf-Peter
Calliess & Moritz Renner, Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance, 22 RATIO
JURIS 260 (2009); Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC’Y 231
(2016).
48. Clive M. Schmitthoff, International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, in 2 CURRENT LAW
AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 129 (1961); Berthold Goldman, Frontières du droit et “lex mercatoria,” 9 ARCHIVES
DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 177 (1964).
49. Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW
WITHOUT A STATE 3, 8 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
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Article’s purposes it will suffice to acknowledge that there is a cornucopia of private
ordering mechanisms – with differing degrees of public sector involvement – that
are not limited to one national jurisdiction. These phenomena can be termed
transnational to the extent that they transcend the boundaries
between national and international law: they are neither creatures of domestic
nor of public international, i.e. inter-state, law,
between unity and fragmentation: they do not form a self-sufficient legal order
comparable to national legal systems, and
between public and private ordering: they are heavily based on mechanisms of
private ordering, but often rely on public enforcement mechanisms, e.g. through
state courts.50
The elements of such orders are well captured by Halliday’s and Shaffer’s
concept of transnational legal orders (TLO).51 TLOs constitute functional
equivalents to state law in the dimensions of rule-making, adjudication and
enforcement.52 In these three dimensions, they involve legal norms, produced by or
with legal bodies that transcend nation states and are engaged with legal bodies
within multiple nation states.53
2. Ordering the Bond Market
a. Formalized TLO
Global bond markets are largely structured as a TLO in this sense. Bond issues
heavily rely on standard documentation that is developed by industry associations
such as the US-based Securities Industry and Financial and Markets Association
(SIFMA) and the Zurich-based ICMA. Whereas the SIFMA seems to play an
important role in the market for bonds denominated in US-Dollar, the ICMA is the
leading standard-setter for Euro-denominated bonds. The associations often work
together, e.g. on interest-rate benchmarks54 and on standard agreements for the
repo market55 The structure and function of both associations is similar, their

50. MORITZ RENNER, ZWINGENDES TRANSNATIONALES RECHT. ZUR STRUKTUR DER
WIRTSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG JENSEITS DES STAATES 215–28 (Nomos ed. 2011).
51. Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDERS 3 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015).
52. Gralf-Peter Calliess et al., Transformations of Commercial Law: New Forms of Legal Certainty for
Globalized Exchange Processes?, in TRANSFORMING THE GOLDEN AGE NATION STATE 83 (Achim
Hurrelmann et al. eds., 2007).
53. Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 51, at 12–17. Who, however, seem to limit their definition to
“formalized” legal “texts,” see infra note 58.
54. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass’n., ISDA, AFME, ICMA, SIFMA and SIFMA AMG Launch
Benchmark Transition Roadmap (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.sifma.org/resources/news/1569 24/ (last
accessed Sept. 28, 2019).
55. Int’l Capital Mkt. Ass’n., Global Master Repurchase Agreement, https://www.icmagroup.org
/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/repo-and-collateral-markets/legal-documentation/global master-repurchase-agreement-gmra/ (last accessed Sept. 28, 2019).
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membership is constituted by financial institutions from around the world.56 The
following remarks focus on the example of the ICMA.
Members of the ICMA, mostly banks and other market participants from
more than 60 countries, work together in a number of committees in order to set
standards for global primary and secondary bond markets. The ICMA’s Legal and
Documentation Committee consists of the heads and senior members of the legal
transaction management teams of member firms. The standard documentation
elaborated by the committee is intended as market “best practice.” Its real impact
on market practice can hardly be overestimated. As bonds are heavily traded on
cross-border secondary markets, bond documentation needs to be highly
standardized in order to generate a marketable financial instrument that is not
limited to a single jurisdiction. Therefore, bond-issuers usually stick closely to the
market standard provisions outlined in the ICMA “Primary Market Handbook”
when drafting the bond indentures.
The indentures will invariably contain a choice-of-law clause subjecting the
bond to the jurisdiction of state courts. However, scope and detail of the bond
indentures are such that there is usually not much room for resorting to rules of
domestic law. Rights and duties of the parties are effectively determined by the
transnational rules that are elaborated and continuously updated by the ICMA.
To the extent that fiduciary duties are assumed by one of the parties, e.g. by
the lead manager of a bond issue, they are expressly spelled out in the contract or a
separate trust deed. If there is no mention of fiduciary duties, there is a high
probability that the relevant ICMA committees did not deem them necessary or
conducive to the functioning of the bond market.
b. Informal Rules in TLOs?
At the same time, it is important to note that the practice of bond market
participants is not determined by contract language alone. It is also embedded in
different layers of relational and social norms.57 These norms are often informal in
nature. They are thus not clearly encompassed by Halliday’s and Shaffer’s concept of
TLOs.58 Yet such rules may structure whole fields of cross-border transactions.
Empirical studies on industries as diverse as the international cotton trade and the

56. In the case of the SIFMA and their respective subsidiaries in the United States, see Sec.
Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass’n., Member Directory, https://www.sifma.org/about/member-directory/ (last
accessed Sept. 28, 2019).
57. On the concept of relational norms, see generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract:
What We Do and Do Not Know, 3 WIS. L. REV. 483 (1985); on the concept of social norms, see Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 THE
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 115, 138 (1992); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
58. Cf. Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 51, at 15–16.
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global software industry have shown the high significance of informal norms of
cooperation.59
Most actors in the bond market are repeat players. Global banks cooperate in
different settings, as managers of a bond issue or as members of a financing
consortium. In the course of cooperation, they form mutual, or relational,
expectations of behavior. Many banks active in the primary market are also
interested in a stable business relationship with the bond-issuer. They know well
that “continuity [of cooperation] can be put in jeopardy by defecting from the spirit
of cooperation and reverting to the letter [of a formal contract].”60 Thus, in the
words of R. Ellickson, relational norms constitute an effective means of “secondparty control” of behavior.61
On a wider scale, market participants feel obliged to a number of unwritten
rules that are considered necessary for the functioning of the market as a whole. In
Ellickson’s taxonomy of private ordering, these norms can be termed mechanisms
of “third-party control” as they extend well beyond bilateral relationships between
market participants and can be enforced by third parties.62 Sometimes, market
participants comply with the unwritten rules of market practice out of mere selfinterest. In most cases, they simply have nothing to gain from disruptive behavior.
In other instances, market actors comply with the unwritten rules of the industry
for fear of retribution by third parties. As in other industries, “black lists” and “white
lists” are widely used in financial markets to exclude non-cooperating players from
future transactions.
Are there any unwritten rules of market practice that might influence the legal
evaluation of the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute? Empirical research shows that
creditors almost never accelerate a corporate loan or bond in case of a technical
event of default.63 They mostly refrain from doing so for fear of a domino effect:
as soon as one creditor demands immediate repayment, others will follow suit and
try to take hold of the borrower’s assets.64 Mandatory disclosure of the default will
further impair the financial situation of the borrower. Bankruptcy then seems the
all but inevitable consequence. Therefore, creditors usually coordinate in order to
adapt financing conditions when a covenant has been breached, rather than declare

59. For the cotton trade, see Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). Barak D. Richman, Ethnic
Networks, Extra-legal Certainty, and Globalization: Peering into the Diamond Industry, in CONTRACTUAL
CERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 31 (Volkmar Gessner ed. 2008); for the software industry see
THOMAS DIETZ, GLOBAL ORDER BEYOND LAW: HOW INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGIES FACILITATE RELATIONAL CONTRACTING IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Hugh
Collins et al. eds., Hart 2014).
60. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
61. On this terminology see ELLICKSON, supra note 57, at 126–32.
62. Id. at 126–32.
63. DANIELA MATRI, COVENANTS AND THIRD-PARTY CREDITORS 115–46 (Springer Int’l.
Publ’g. AG 2017).
64. Id. at 130–32.
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an event of default and accelerate the loan or bond.65 But can this – factual –
standard behavior of bond creditors be regarded a transnational legal norm?
This question points to the one of the eternal problems of legal theory, the
distinction between law and social norms.66 From a functional perspective, much is
to be said for the proposition that behavioral norms become law as soon as they are
integrated into the communicative structures of the legal system.67 For the purposes
of this Article, the question does not need to be answered conclusively. Instead, I
suggest that behavioral standards in the bond market can and should be reflected in
the traditional categories of contract and fiduciary law doctrine (infra IV.2.b).
B. Transnational Fiduciary Law
This approach implies that the transnational legal order that has emerged in
the global bond market is not an autonomous legal system of its own that could be
chosen as applicable law under conflict-of-laws rules (infra a). Instead, it constitutes
and defines the legitimate expectations of the parties that form the basis of fiduciary
duties in both common and civil law jurisdictions (infra b).
1. Transnational Fiduciary Law as Non-state Law
If standard contracts and usages in transnational bond markets were defined
as a legal order in its own right, market participants might conceivable choose them
as the law applicable to their contractual relations, based on general conflict-of-laws
rules. As a consequence, the existence and scope of fiduciary duties would have to
be discussed solely within the system of these privately made norms. The parties
would be able to opt out of the relevant state law,68 at least within the boundaries
of international public policy.
It is disputed whether a choice of law can point to non-state law at all. In the
US and UK literature, the question is hardly discussed at all.69 In Continental
Europe, there has been an intense debate on the matter.70 However, it has been
largely settled by the EU legislator. The wording of the relevant Art. 3 Rome I
Regulation and related provisions were put in a manner that limits the permissible

65. For empirical evidence see id. at 130–32.
66. Calliess & Renner, supra note 47, at 262.
67. Id. at 267–68.
68. Cf. Bernstein, supra note 57, at 154–57.
69. Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge
from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE LAW REVIEW 1209, 1210 et seq. (2005).
70. Andreas Kappus, “Lex mercatoria” als Geschäftsstatut vor staatlichen Gerichten im deutschen
internationalen Schuldrecht, IPRAX 137(1993); Stefan Leible, Parteiautonomie im IPR - Allgemeines
Anknüpfungsprinzip oder Verlegenheitslösung?, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ERIK JAYME ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG
485, 490 (Heinz-Peter Mansel et al. eds., 2004); Johannes Christian Wichard, Die Anwendung der
UNIDROIT-Prinzipien für internationale Handelsverträge durch Schiedsgerichte und staatliche Gerichte, 60
RABELSZ, 269, 282 et seq. (1996).
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choice of law to the “law of a country”, while earlier drafts of the regulation had
expressly allowed for a choice of non-state “rules of law.”71
2. Transnational Fiduciary Duties in State Law
Thus, even in a field that is largely determined by transnational legal ordering,
such as the global bond market, the rights and obligations of market actors,
including their fiduciary duties, are subject to state law. Yet, as I will argue, fiduciary
duties under both common and civil law must be defined with a view to the
transnational dimension of the social field concerned.
a. Common Law
There is no single overarching theory explaining the imposition of fiduciary
duties under the common law.72 A particularly convincing attempt at combining the
relevant criteria set out by courts and commentators that shall be explored in this
Article has been developed by Paul Finn and further elaborated by Deborah
DeMott.73 The approach has recently gained broader support among courts and
commentators in Commonwealth countries.74
This approach argues, in brief, that fiduciary duties are based on “justifiable
expectations of loyalty.”75 Both the identification of fiduciary relationships and the
imposition of distinct fiduciary duties rely on this concept. As to the identification
of a fiduciary relationship, Paul Finn convincingly argues that it implies an
assessment that “cannot be arrived at by any process of strict legal reasoning:”76 “A
variable mix of legal phenomena, factual phenomena, presumptions, and public
policy, guide and structure the judgment made when a character is to be attributed
to a relationship.”77
The expectations-based approach is especially fruitful when applied to the
“non-conventional, atypical, fact-based, and informal fiduciary relationships”78 that
might be at play in the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute. Conceptually, it ties in with
the often-cited entry in Black’s Law Dictionary which defines the fiduciary relation
as arising “whenever confidence is reposed on one side, and domination and

71. Ulrich Magnus, Die Rom I-Verordnung, IPRAX, 27, 33 (2010); Giesela Rühl, Rechtswahlfreiheit
im europäischen Kollisionsrecht, in DIE RICHTIGE ORDNUNG. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JAN KROPHOLLER ZUM
70. GEBURTSTAG 187–89 (Dietmar Baetge ed., 2008); Stefan Leible & Matthias Lehmann, Die
Verordnung über das auf vertragliche Schuldverhältnisse anzuwendende Recht (“Rom I”), RIW 528, 533 (2008).
72. For an overview of the current debate see Paul B. Miller, The Identification of Fiduciary
Relationships, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
73. Paul Finn, Contract and the Fiduciary Principle, 12 UNSW L. J. 76 (1989); DeMott, supra note
18, at 938. For an application of the approach to the field of investment law see Andrew F. Tuch,
Investment Banks as Fiduciaries, 29 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 478 (2005).
74. Tuch, supra note 73, 482; DeMott, supra note 18 at 938.
75. DeMott, supra note 18, at 934-38.
76. Finn, supra note 73, at 83.
77. Id. at 87.
78. DeMott, supra note 18, at 940.
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influence result on the other; the relation can be legal, social, domestic, or merely
personal.”79
It is rare that fiduciary relationships arise alongside an existing contractual
relationship.80 Interestingly, however, Paul Finn makes the case that specifically
bank-borrower relationships are prone to give rise to fiduciary relationships: Banks
“are not charitable institutions” – yet the transformation of bank-customer
relationships over time, the complexity of financial transactions and the social role
of banks as performing “vital public services” generate justifiable expectations of
behavior that are legally protected as a fiduciary relationship.81
These justifiable expectations also form the basis for the specific duties arising
out of the fiduciary relationship. DeMott identifies a number of circumstances in
which an actor has “justifiable expectations of loyalty” towards a potential fiduciary:
Such expectations may arise “in the course of the parties’ relationship over time,”
based on “an actor’s evident allegiances,” and in case of the beneficiary’s “inability
to self-protect.”82 DeMott’s contribution to the discussion is both exemplary and
particularly important because it –maybe unknowingly– indicates how sociological
insights can inform the doctrine of fiduciary duties.
This Article assumes that a sociologically informed approach to legal doctrine
is desirable to the extent that it allows for a “reflexive law,” i.e. legal norms that
provide legal certainty and at the same time adapt to the circumstances of the social
field they regulate.83 Professor DeMott’s approach takes an important step in this
direction. When she acknowledges the importance of “the course of the parties’
relationship over time,” this comes very close to sociological accounts of the
function of “relational norms” (supra IV.1.b.2). The concept effectively refers to
the mutual expectations of behavior formed by the parties of a bilateral relationship
that play a crucial role in transnational legal ordering.
These relational norms are often complemented with expectations of behavior
that arise not from the bilateral relationship between two parties, but from the
common usage of all market participants. A prime example if the effect of social
“roles:”84 when assuming a certain role, professional or otherwise, or when entering
into a specific social field, actors are necessarily subject to a number of generalized
expectations of behavior. A lawyer, for example, is expected to behave in a way that
is loyal to the interests of her client – because she is a lawyer. In a similar manner,
bond market participants are subject to a set of behavioral expectations that are

79. Fiduciary Relationship, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The definition has been
considerably expanded in the 11th ed. 2019.
80. Finn, supra note 73, at 94.
81. Id. at 95.
82. DeMott, supra note 18, at 941–48.
83. See generally Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Private Law, 17 L.
& SOC. REV. 239 (1983). Specifically for transnational law, see Gralf-Peter Calliess, Reflexive Transnational
Law. The Privatisation of Civil Law and the Civilisation of Private Law, 23 ZFRSOZ 185(2002).
84. DeMott, supra note 18 at 938–40.
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formed by market practice. These generalized expectations play a decisive role in
the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute, as will be shown below (infra IV.2.b.2).
b. Civil Law
In spite of its differing doctrinal framing, the civil law approach to fiduciary
duties provides similar “points of entry” for expectations generated in settings of
transnational private ordering.85 Such a “point of entry” may be found in the
prohibition of self-contradictory behavior that forms part of the German concept
of fiduciary duties (supra II.1.b). Similar to the “justifiable expectations” test in the
common law approach to fiduciary duties (supra IV.2.b.1), the principle of
consistency may build upon the relational as well as the generalized expectations of
behavior held by the actors involved. German commentators expressly refer to the
notion of “justifiable expectations” when it comes to spelling out the conditions of
the abuse-of-rights doctrine and the prohibition of self-contradictory behavior.86
C. Fiduciary Duties in the Bond Market Revisited
What does this mean for the Windstream v. Aurelius dispute? How can fiduciary
law reflect transnational legal ordering in bond markets? The answer turns on the
concept of “justifiable expectations” that arguably forms the basis of the relevant
doctrines in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. At the same time, it
depends on relationship between formal and informal elements in transnational
legal orders. The formal rules in transnational standard documentation are rather
clear on the existence of fiduciary duties of bondholders. They do foresee specific
situations in which a bondholder might act as a fiduciary of other bondholders.
These situations are limited to instances where a bondholder expressly assumes the
role of a fiduciary, e.g. as an agent of the underwriting banks. In all other instances,
bondholders are restrained by majority thresholds or quorums, not fiduciary duties.
In our case, the bond indenture permitted Aurelius to act on Windstream’s
covenant violation because Aurelius held 25 % of the outstanding bonds. Thus, the
formalized bond documentation created no expectation on part of other
bondholders that Aurelius would not make use of its right to demand immediate
repayment of the bond (supra II). Quite to the contrary, the imposition of a
fiduciary duty restraining Aurelius from doing so would run counter to the declared
intentions of the parties.
However, matters become more complicated when we take into account the
informal rules of transnational ordering that are at play here. As market practice
diverges from the black letter of the contract, so might the expectations of the
parties. If almost all market participants refrain from enforcing bond covenants

85.

On general clauses as a means of “socialization of contract” see Teubner, supra note 83, at

277.
86. Dirk Olzen & Dirk Looschelders, in J. VON STAUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM
BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH § 242, para. 286 (De Gruyter ed. 2015).

2020]

TRANSNATIONAL FIDUCIARY LAW IN BOND MARKETS

131

almost all of the time (supra IV.1.b.2), this will necessarily give rise to the
expectation that a particular covenant will not be enforced in this particular instance.
Is this expectation justifiable in the sense that it should be legally protected by
the imposition of a fiduciary relationship and fiduciary duties of loyalty and/or care?
This normative question cannot be reduced to a –necessarily arbitrary– moral
evaluation of the conflicting claims of the parties. Instead, it must be answered with
a view to the functional rationality of the social field concerned.87 That bondholders
generally make use of covenants only in a coordinated manner is not by chance, and
it is neither merely in their self-interest. The factual collectivization of acceleration
rights also serves a broader purpose: it helps bondholders to overcome the
collective action problem posed by the threat of a creditors’ race. Only if
bondholders refrain from accelerating their bonds individually, a solution that is
sustainable for all investors can be found.
Thus, it seems highly plausible that both Windstream and other bondholders
had a justifiable expectation that Aurelius would not accelerate the bond and cause
Windstream’s default. This justifiable expectation has to be reflected by fiduciary
law doctrine in both common and civil law jurisdictions. Conceptually, it can be
framed as a good faith duty to act in accordance with the interests of the bondissuer as well as other bondholders – to the extent that these interests are
substantiated in specific expectations of behavior.88 However, imposing a fiduciary
duty on Aurelius to refrain from acceleration would also have a positive side effect
on the swap market as it would limit the potential for information arbitrage for
CDS-insured bondholders.
However, imposing on Aurelius a fiduciary duty to refrain from accelerating
the bond would mean that the informal expectations formed by participants in
transnational markets would effectively trump the formal rules laid down in
transnational standard contracts. As these contracts aim at conclusively regulating
the collective use of default clauses through majority and quorum requirements,
they can be considered as a collective opt-out of fiduciary duties. Is such an opt-out
permissible?
The question is highly controversial in both common law and civil law
discourse.89 In settings of transnational legal ordering, the question needs to be

87. Gunther Teubner, After Privatization? The Many Autonomies of Private Law, 51 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 393 (1998).
88. On the role of the principle of good faith under civil law doctrines of fiduciary law see supra
III.1.b; On the duty of good faith in the context of the fiduciary duty of loyalty in common law doctrine
see Andrew S. Gold, The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW
390–91 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
89. For U.S. law see, for example, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits
of Contract, 47 STANFORD L. REV., 211, 249–51 (1995). For legal comparative overviews of the debate,
mostly from the perspective of company law, see Holger Fleischer & Lars Harzmeier, Zur Abdingbarkeit
der Treuepflichten bei Personengesellschaft und GmbH, 18 NZG 1289(2015); Alexander Hellgardt, Abdingbarkeit
der gesellschaftsrechtlichen Treuepflicht, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 24.
AUG. 2010: UNTERNEHMEN, MARKT UND VERANTWORTUNG, 89 (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds.,
2010);
MAXIMILIAN MANN, ABDINGBARKEIT UND GEGENSTAND DER GESEL
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addressed from a somewhat different perspective. If the purpose of fiduciary duties
in this context is to preserve the functionality of transnational legal orders, then the
bar is set high for justifying the imposition of fiduciary duties on individual market
participants. To the extent that formal rules of transnational legal ordering, such as
standard contracts, are made and adapted in an inclusive and transparent procedure,
it can be presumed that all relevant concerns are adequately reflected in the rules.90
Accordingly, it should be left to the transnational rulemaking process to define the
reach of fiduciary duties. If formalized transnational rules are silent on the matter,
they may be complemented by informal expectations of behavior as default rules.
If, in contrast, they clearly aimed at conclusively regulating the duties of market
participants, there is no room for imposing fiduciary duties and, through the
formalized rules of the standard contracts, market participants opt out of the default
rules.
As a consequence, Windstream’s claim against Aurelius has to be dismissed
under both common and civil law rules, as would have to be claims of other
bondholders. Even though Windstream and other bondholders had a justifiable
expectation based in transnational market practice that the bond would not be
accelerated, the relevant transnational standard contracts effectively opt out of the
bondholders’ fiduciary duties.
V. CONCLUSION
Under traditional doctrines of fiduciary law in both the common and the civil
law tradition, the practice of net-short debt investing is hard to capture. However,
fiduciary law doctrine accepts that justified expectations giving rise to a fiduciary
relationship may be formed not only in the bilateral relation between two parties,
but also in the wider setting of a market or social field. By translating these
expectations into legal rights and obligations, it can be a powerful tool for enabling
and framing private ordering. In this sense, “transnational fiduciary law” stands for
an approach that seeks to re-interpret existing doctrines of fiduciary law in light of
the specific problems of cooperation arising in transnational settings. Both formal
and informal elements of transnational legal orders are thus reflected in the rules
and principles of state law.
Under a transnational fiduciary law approach, strategies of net-short debt
investing may amount to violations of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. They run counter
to the justifiable expectation of bond-issuer and other bondholders alike that default
provisions in bond indentures are only enforced for securing or facilitating
repayment of the bond. This informal expectation of behavior may complement the
formalized rules of transnational standard contracts that structure global bond

TREUEPFLICHT 73–92 (Holger Fleischer et al. eds., Duncker & Humblot
2018).
90. On the underlying “constitutionalization” of transnational legal orders see, for example,
Moritz Renner, Occupy the System! Societal Constitutionalism and Transnational Corporate Accounting, 20
INDIANA J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 941 (2013).
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markets. However, market participants may also use standard contracts for
collectively opting out of fiduciary duties.

